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OPINION 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 Appellee Han Tak Lee was convicted of murdering his 
daughter based primarily on scientific evidence that, as the 
Commonwealth now concedes, is discredited by subsequent 
scientific developments.  Lee thus filed a § 2254 habeas 
petition claiming his conviction violated due process.  The 
District Court granted habeas relief, and we affirm. 
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I. Background1 
 Mr. Lee’s daughter, Ji Yun Lee, suffered from severe 
mental illness throughout her life, experiencing both suicidal 
and homicidal ideation.  She lived with her family in New 
York during the summer of 1989.  In the early morning of 
July 28, police officers found Lee retrieving personal items 
from the street that his daughter had thrown out the window.  
The officers entered the house and found Ji Yun in a manic 
state, arguing with family members who were urging her to 
take her medications.  The officers observed no evidence of 
violence against her. 
 At the suggestion of his pastor, Lee took his daughter 
the same day to Camp Hebron, a religious retreat in Monroe 
County, Pennsylvania.  Her erratic behavior continued.  Soon 
after arriving, Ji Yun went for a walk and returned several 
hours later soaking wet, having jumped into a body of water.  
Later that day, she became agitated and had to be physically 
restrained.  A few hours after midnight, a fire began in the 
Lees’ cabin.  Han Tak Lee escaped, but his daughter died.  
 The Commonwealth charged Lee with arson and 
murder.  During an eight-day trial, it relied heavily on fire-
science and gas-chromatography evidence to argue that Lee 
intentionally set the fire to kill his daughter.  The defense 
countered that she set the fire as a suicidal act.  Lee was 
convicted on both charges and sentenced to life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole.  
 On direct appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania 
remanded for an evidentiary hearing on ineffective-
                                              
1 We discussed the background of this case in greater detail in 
our prior opinion.  See Lee v. Glunt, 667 F.3d 397, 400–03 
(3d Cir. 2012). 
4 
 
assistance-of-counsel claims.  During that hearing, the Court 
also received evidence about developments in the field of fire 
science that, according to a prior panel of our Court, 
“provided ample reason to question the reliability of the arson 
investigation.”  Lee v. Glunt, 667 F.3d 397, 401 (3d Cir. 
2012).  The trial court nonetheless denied Lee’s claims, the 
Superior Court affirmed, and the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court denied appeal. 
 In 1995 Lee filed a pro se post-conviction petition in 
state court.  The Commonwealth did not comply with the 
court’s order to respond, and the petition remained pending 
until 2001 when the attorney who is now representing Lee 
filed leave to amend the petition.  He submitted an amended 
petition in 2005, arguing that (1) Lee was entitled to a new 
trial because of newly discovered and exculpatory scientific 
evidence, and (2) appellate counsel was ineffective on direct 
appeal by failing to raise a claim of after-discovered 
exculpatory evidence.  The Court of Common Pleas denied 
the petition for post-conviction relief, the Superior Court 
affirmed, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied 
appeal. 
 Lee filed a § 2254 habeas petition in the District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, claiming that (1) his 
conviction violated due process because it was based on 
inaccurate and unreliable evidence and (2) his continued 
incarceration also lacked the due process due him because 
newly developed scientific evidence showed he was probably 
innocent.2  The District Court denied Lee’s petition and 
request for an evidentiary hearing because “claims of actual 
innocence based on newly discovered evidence are never 
grounds for federal habeas relief absent an independent 
                                              
2 The Commonwealth conceded that Lee exhausted state 
court remedies.  See Lee, 667 F.3d at 402. 
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constitutional violation.”  Lee v. Tennis, No. 08-1972, 2010 
WL 3812160, *5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2010).   
 A panel of our court reversed on appeal.  Explaining 
that Lee’s petition raised a due-process claim rather than a 
free-standing innocence claim, Lee, 667 F.3d at 403 n.5, we 
ordered the District Court to grant discovery and then 
reconsider whether to hold an evidentiary hearing.  Id. at 
404–07 & n.7.  We instructed that Lee “must show that the 
admission of the fire expert testimony undermined the 
fundamental fairness of the entire trial because the probative 
value of [the fire expert] evidence, though relevant, is greatly 
outweighed by the prejudice to the accused from its 
admission.”  Id. at 403 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted, alteration in original).  We also implied that habeas 
relief should be denied if there is “ample other evidence of 
guilt.”  Id. at 407 n.13 (quoting Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 
103, 126 (3d Cir. 2007)). 
 On remand, Magistrate Judge Carlson held an 
evidentiary hearing and issued a Report & Recommendation 
(R&R) finding that “the admission of the fire expert 
testimony undermined the fundamental fairness of the entire 
trial” because the “verdict . . . rest[ed] almost entirely upon 
scientific pillars which have now eroded.”  Lee v. Tennis, No. 
08-1972, 2014 WL 3894306, at *15–16 (June 13, 2014) 
[hereinafter R&R].  It also found that the Commonwealth 
failed to show other “‘ample evidence’ of guilt upon which 
the jury could have relied.”  Id. at *18 (quoting Albrecht, 485 
F.3d at 126). 
 Along with a two-page memorandum, the 
Commonwealth filed three objections to the R&R before the 
District Court:  
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1. [It] underplayed the strength of 
the Commonwealth’s case in general. 
2. [It] overstated the importance of 
the differences between the 
spectrographs for Lee’s pants and shirt, 
and the jug and the glove found at the 
fire scene. 
3. []Lee has not been exonerated by 
the new fire science evidence. 
App. E. at 1–3. 
 The District Court rejected the third objection because, 
as explained in our prior opinion in this case, Lee’s due-
process claim does not require a showing of innocence.  Lee 
v. Tennis, No. 08-1972, 2014 WL 3900230, *5 (M.D. Pa. 
Aug. 8, 2014) (citing Lee, 667 F.3d at 403 n.5).  In addition, 
the Court rejected the first and second objections because the 
Commonwealth failed to identify with specificity any legal or 
factual errors in the R&R.  Id.  In the absence of any proper 
objections, the District Court reviewed the R&R for clear 
error and adopted it without changes.  Id. at *4–5.  It then 
issued an order granting habeas relief unless the 
Commonwealth “retr[ied] . . . or release[d]” Lee within 120 
days.  Id. at *7. 
 The Local Rules in the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania require filing a notice of appeal electronically.  
The District’s electronic filing system requires that the 
moving party simultaneously pay a $505 filing fee.  As the 
credit account for the County of Monroe limits payments to 
$500, the Commonwealth was unable to pay the fee by credit 
card.  Instead, it mailed a notice of appeal along with a check 
on September 5, 2014.  The District Court Clerk’s Office 
received the package on September 8, exactly 30 days after 
entry of judgment.  The docket initially indicated that the 
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notice was filed the next day, September 9, but a few weeks 
later the Clerk’s Office noted on the docket that the “[f]iled 
date for the notice of appeal has been corrected to reflect the 
date of 9/8/2014, the date it was received by the Court.” 
II. Jurisdiction 
 A “certificate of appealabilty is not required when a 
state . . . appeals” a grant of habeas relief.  Fed. R. App. P. 
22(b)(3); see also Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 230 
n.16 (3d Cir. 2004).  We thus have appellate jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a) if the Commonwealth 
“filed” a notice of appeal “within 30 days after the entry 
of . . . judgment.”  28 U.S.C. § 2107. 
 
 Lee first argues that the notice of appeal was untimely 
because the Clerk’s Office did not file it until 31 days after 
entry of judgment.  This is a non-starter.  Under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 5(d)(2), a notice of appeal is “filed by 
delivering it . . . to the clerk,” id., and is delivered when 
received by the clerk, Parissi v. Telechron, Inc., 349 U.S. 46, 
47 (1955) (per curiam) (“[T]he Clerk’s receipt of the notice 
of appeal within the 30-day period satisfied the requirements 
of § 2107.”); United States v. Solly, 545 F.2d 874, 876 (3d 
Cir. 1976) (“The date of receipt by the clerk’s office controls, 
rather than the date it is filed by the clerk’s personnel.”).  The 
parties and the Clerk’s Office all agree that the notice was 
received on the 30th day.  That it was not filed officially until 
the day after is irrelevant to our jurisdiction. 
 
 Lee next argues that the notice of appeal cannot confer 
appellate jurisdiction because its format did not comply with 
local rules.  As he points out, under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 5(d)(3) a “court may . . . allow papers to be 
filed . . . by electronic means” and “may require electronic 
filing . . . if reasonable exceptions are allowed.”  Id. 
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(emphasis added).  Local Rule 5.6 in the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania states that “[a]ny document required or 
permitted to be filed shall be filed electronically.”  M.D. Pa. 
R. 5.6.  According to Lee, the Commonwealth’s notice of 
appeal is invalid because it was submitted on paper in 
violation of the local rules. 
 
 Once more we disagree.  The Federal Rules require 
that a notice of appeal “(A) specify the party . . . taking the 
appeal . . . ; (B) designate the judgment . . . being appealed; 
and (C) name the court to which the appeal is taken.”  Fed. R. 
App. P. 3(c)(1).  Courts employ “a commonsense, purposive 
approach to determine whether a notice of appeal complies 
with the rules.”  Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Mills, 634 F.3d 
746, 751 (3d Cir. 2011).  Indeed, “imperfections in noticing 
an appeal should not be fatal where no genuine doubt exists 
about who is appealing, from what judgment, to which 
appellate court.”  Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 767 
(2001); Mills, 634 F.3d at 751; see also id. at 752 (“[A]s long 
as the judgment the party intends to appeal is fairly 
discernible, a notice of appeal will be deemed sufficient even 
though it references the wrong case number . . .  or the wrong 
judgment date.” (citations omitted)).  Lee does not argue that 
the notice of appeal failed to answer any of these three critical 
questions. Following the Ninth Circuit, we thus reject the 
argument that the notice of appeal was invalid simply because 
it violated a local electronic filing requirement.3  See Klemm 
v. Astrue, 543 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A] notice of 
appeal is filed when it is received by the clerk, 
notwithstanding deficiencies in form that violate local rules 
                                              
3 That the notice of appeal confers appellate jurisdiction does 
not leave the district court “without other sanctions” for 
violations of local filing requirements.  Parissi, 349 U.S. at 
47; see also Gould, 555 F.2d at 341. 
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. . . [, including] failure to comply with the local electronic 
filing rules.”).   
 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(d)(4) supports our 
conclusion.  It states that the “clerk must not refuse to file a 
paper solely because it is not in the form prescribed by these 
rules or by a local rule or practice.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d)(4).  
In addition, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(4) 
provides that an “appeal must not be dismissed for 
informality of form . . . of the notice of appeal.”  Our 
conclusion is further supported by Lee’s failure to argue that 
the paper submission prejudiced him in any way.  Mills, 634 
F.3d at 752 (“While a lack of prejudice will not save a notice 
that totally fails to comply with the rules, courts 
understandably are more willing to overlook a notice’s flaws 
in the absence of prejudice to the opposing party.” (citations 
omitted)); Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 67 n.21 
(1978) (“A mistake in designating the judgment appealed 
from is not always fatal, so long as the intent to appeal from a 
specific ruling can fairly be inferred by probing the notice and 
the other party was not misled or prejudiced.”). 
 Lee’s jurisdictional challenge is unpersuasive for 
another reason as well.  In Parissi, the Supreme Court held 
that a clerk’s office cannot reject a notice of appeal simply 
because the filing fee has not been paid.4  349 U.S. at 47 
                                              
4 We note there is some ambiguity about the status of Parissi 
because the Supreme Court Reporter, which is published by 
West, appears to label the opinion as a Memorandum 
Decision.  Parissi v. Telechron, Inc., 75 S. Ct. 577, 577 
(1955).  But the United States Reports, the official reporter 
for the Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C. § 411, treats the case as an 
opinion of the Court.  Compare 349 U.S. LIII (1954) (“Cases 
reported before page 901 are those decided with opinions of 
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(“[U]ntimely payment of the . . . fee did not vitiate the 
validity of petitioner’s notice of appeal.”).  We have similarly 
instructed the clerk’s offices in the Third Circuit to “accept 
and retain every notice of appeal tendered whether or not 
accompanied by the filing fee.”  Gould v. Members of the N.J. 
Div. of Water Pol’y and Supply, 555 F.2d 340, 342 (3d Cir. 
1977).  This rule applies whether a human clerk or an 
electronic filing system receives the notice.  See Farzana K. 
v. Ind. Dep’t of Educ., 473 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(“The software that operates an e-filing system acts for ‘the 
clerk’ as far as Rule 5 is concerned; a step forbidden to a 
person standing at a counter is equally forbidden to an 
automated agent that acts on the court’s behalf.”); Royall v. 
Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 548 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 
2008) (“[T]he electronic case filing system’s failure to docket 
                                                                                                     
the Court.  Those reported on pages 901 et seq. are 
memorandum decisions and orders.”), with Parissi, 349 U.S. 
46.  The Supreme Court has cited Parissi as legal authority 
without questioning its status.  See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 
266, 273 (1988).  And in a dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan, 
joined by Justices Frankfurter and Burton, described Parissi 
as an “intervening and controlling decision” with respect to 
another case not before the Supreme Court at the time.  
United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U.S. 98, 105 n.16 
(1957).  We have cited Parissi as legal authority at least three 
times, Wisniewski v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. 
Programs, 929 F.2d 952, 955 (3d Cir. 1991); Gould v. 
Members of N.J. Div. of Water Pol’y and Supply, 555 F.2d 
340, 341 (3d Cir. 1977); Rothman v. United States, 508 F.2d 
648, 651–52 & n.17 (3d Cir. 1975), and on one of those 
occasions it “mandated” our “result,” Gould, 555 F.2d at 341.  
We therefore have little trouble concluding that Parissi is 
binding Supreme Court precedent. 
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Royall’s timely submitted notice of appeal cannot be treated 
as a failure on his part to file timely. His situation is akin to 
one in which the clerk’s office misplaces a filing and then 
later makes the docket entry when the filing is found.”). 
 The parties agree that the Middle District’s electronic 
filing system rejects notices of appeal that lack a 
simultaneous fee payment.  Appellant Br. at 29–30; Appellee 
Br. at 24.  If Lee were correct that under Local Rule 5.6 
parties cannot establish appellate jurisdiction by submitting a 
paper notice of appeal, then the Commonwealth could not 
have submitted a notice of appeal without simultaneously 
paying the required filing fees.  This arrangement would 
clearly violate Parissi.  If so, Local Rule 5.6 would violate 
the Federal Rules by failing to provide a “reasonable 
exception[]” to the local electronic filing requirement, Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 5(d)(3), and the Commonwealth could not be held 
responsible for its violation.   
 As we have appellate jurisdiction, we proceed to the 
merits. 
III. Standard of Review 
A. AEDPA Deference 
 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) of the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) requires federal habeas courts to 
“afford considerable deference to state courts’ legal and 
factual determinations.”  Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 
391–92 (3d Cir. 2010).  A panel of our Court previously held, 
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however, that deference does not apply here.  Lee, 667 F.3d at 
403.5  We therefore review the case without deference. 
B. Plain Error 
 The District Court rejected the Commonwealth’s first 
and second objections to the R&R because they failed to 
identify with specificity any factual or legal errors.  It thus 
reviewed the R&R for clear error rather than conducting a de 
novo review.  On appeal, the Commonwealth does not 
challenge this legal conclusion.  “[W]here a party fails to file 
timely objections to a magistrate judge’s R&R in a habeas 
proceeding, and the district court then adopts the R&R, 
we . . . only review the R&R for plain error.”  Nara v. Frank, 
                                              
5 Our opinion, issued in 2012, explained that Lee’s habeas 
petition merits de novo review because the state courts “relied 
on only state law to deny [Lee’s] PCRA petition, and there 
[was] no indication that the state courts analyzed Lee’s 
federal claims.”  Lee, 667 F.3d at 403.  Since this decision, 
the Supreme Court has held that when a state court “rejects a 
federal claim without expressly addressing that claim, a 
federal habeas court must presume that the federal claim was 
adjudicated on the merits—but that presumption can in some 
limited circumstances be rebutted.”  Johnson v. Williams, 133 
S. Ct. 1088, 1096 (2013).  Had we applied this rule in 2012, 
we may have held that AEDPA deference applies.  We 
nonetheless review Lee’s current case without AEDPA 
deference under law of the case.  See Council of Alternative 
Political Parties v. Hooks, 179 F.3d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1999).  
While this doctrine has an exception for intervening changes 
in the law, id., the Commonwealth has not asked us to revisit 
the issue here. 
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488 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2007).  Lee argues that plain error 
thus applies because the District Court, in effect, decided that 
the Commonwealth failed to file any proper objections at all.  
As the Commonwealth concedes, its briefing does not dispute 
that plain error review applies.  Oral Argument Tr. at 5:18.6  
At oral argument we asked why plain error review is 
inappropriate, and the only response was that the 
Commonwealth had “provide[d] some citations to [the R&R] 
when [it] raised [its] objection with regard to Magistrate 
Judge Carlson’s characterization of the evidence.”  Id. 5:40.  
In our own review of the objections, we find no such citations 
to the R&R.  Furthermore, a few citations would not have 
addressed the District Court’s more fundamental concern that 
the Commonwealth’s objections had “no basis in . . . law or 
fact contained in the R&R to be called into question.”  Lee, 
2014 WL 3900230, at *5.  As the Commonwealth fails to 
challenge this determination on appeal and fails to give any 
meaningful reason why plain error review is inappropriate, 
that is the review we undertake.   
 We therefore reverse only if there is (1) an error, 
(2) that is plain, (3) that “affects substantial rights,” and (4) 
that “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Nara, 488 F.3d at 197 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
IV. Merits 
 A panel of our court previously held that “Lee must 
show that the admission of the fire expert testimony 
undermined the fundamental fairness of the entire trial 
because the probative value of [that] evidence, though 
                                              
6 Id. (“Court: Why should we not review this particular appeal 
for plain error? . . . Commonwealth: I agree it was not raised 
in appellant’s brief in this matter . . . .”). 
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relevant, [was] greatly outweighed by the prejudice to the 
accused from its admission.”  Lee, 667 F.3d at 403 (alteration 
in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
The District Court accepted Magistrate Judge Carlson’s 
conclusion that the admission of fire-science and gas-
chromatography evidence at Lee’s trial met this standard and 
the Commonwealth does not challenge this determination on 
appeal.  Instead, it merely argues that the District Court erred 
by accepting Magistrate Judge Carlson’s conclusion that the 
trial lacked “ample other evidence of guilt.”  Id. at 407 n.13 
(citing Albrecht, 485 F.3d at 126).  We now turn to the 
evidence presented at trial, including for the sake of 
completeness the now discredited evidence. 
A. Unreliable Evidence at Trial 
1. Fire-Science Evidence 
 The Commonwealth does not object to Magistrate 
Judge Carlson’s assessment of the fire-science evidence 
presented at trial.  He described it as follows.  State Police 
Fire Marshal Thomas Jones testified that the fire was caused 
by arson based on two sources of evidence.  First, he found 
patterns of deep charring, alligator charring (charring shaped 
like alligator skin), and crazed glass (finely fractured glass), 
all of which were consistent with a fire deliberately started 
with accelerant fluids.  R&R at *5.  Second, he found at least 
eight separate points of origin located throughout the cabin.  
According to the R&R, this was powerful evidence that 
someone intentionally started eight different fires in the cabin 
in rapid succession.  Id.  That one of the points was located at 
the cabin’s door “suggested that the arsonist had acted in a 
particularly calculated fashion, setting fire to the escape path 
in the cabin, and effectively entombing Ji Yun Lee within a 
wall of flames.”  Id. at *6.  Jones cited no other independent 
scientific evidence that arson caused the fire.  Id. 
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 Fire protection specialist Daniel Aston also testified on 
behalf of the Commonwealth.  Relying on the same evidence 
discussed by Jones, Aston opined that the fire was set 
deliberately and with an accelerant.  Id.  He stated that the last 
fire was set at the front door of the cabin and that the arsonist 
“left the structure[] and probably lit [the cabin] from the 
outside at that point.”  Id.  Based on the then-dominant 
scientific theory that arson fires burn at higher levels of heat 
and intensity, Aston compared the estimated heat and energy 
of the actual fire with the heat and energy that would have 
been produced by a “normal” fire.  Id. at *7.  He claimed his 
calculations could “determine with precision both the 
amounts and types of accelerants” used to light the fire: “62 
gallons of home heating fuel, mixed with 12.2 pounds . . . of 
gasoline or Coleman fuel.”  Id. 
 According to Magistrate Judge Carlson, Jones’s and 
Aston’s testimony “constituted the principal pillar of proof 
tying Lee to th[e] arson fire and the death of his daughter.”  
Id.  Their testimony “was not directly supported by any other 
independent chemical testing[, as] the chemical analysis of 
the [eight] suspected fire origin sites did not reveal any sign 
of the more than 60 gallons of gas and fuel oil” that Aston 
estimated were used to set the fire.  Id. 
 The Commonwealth concedes that, due to scientific 
developments since Lee’s trial in 1990, the basis for all of this 
evidence is now invalid. 
2. Chromatography Evidence 
 The Commonwealth also does not challenge 
Magistrate Judge Carlson’s assessment of the 
chromatography evidence presented at trial.  According to the 
R&R, the fire-science evidence described above was 
bolstered by the testimony of State Police Chemist Thomas 
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Pacewicz, who conducted a gas chromatography of the shirt 
and pants worn by Lee on the night of the fire and of a burned 
jug and latex glove recovered from the wreckage.  Id.  
Pacewicz found no evidence of accelerants at the eight origin 
sites identified by Jones and Aston, but testified that the 
chromatography analysis of the shirt, pants, and jug all 
revealed hydrocarbons that “ranged from C-7 to C-22.”  Id.  
He also testified that these results were consistent with a 
mixture of gasoline, kerosene, Coleman fuel and fuel oils.  Id.  
Pacewicz thus corroborated Aston’s testimony that this mix 
of chemicals was used to burn the cabin.  Id.  In its closing 
argument, the Commonwealth emphasized the mutually 
reinforcing link between the fire-science and chromatography 
evidence, which together showed that the fire was set by 
someone who intended to kill an occupant of the cabin and 
matched the mix of chemicals allegedly used to start it with 
the mix found on Lee’s clothes.  Id. at *8. 
 Magistrate Judge Carlson found, and the 
Commonwealth concedes, that subsequent scientific 
developments and retesting of surviving materials from the 
crime scene have undermined the reliability of Pacewicz’s 
testimony.  Id. at *17–18.  On appeal, the Commonwealth 
does not rely on his testimony to show “ample evidence of 
guilt.” 
B. What Evidence Remains? 
 The Commonwealth argues that three remaining 
sources of evidence provide the “ample” evidence needed.  
First, Monroe County Coroner Robert Allen and Forensic 
Pathologist Isidore Mihalikis concluded, based on the autopsy 
of Ji Yun’s body, that the cause and manner of death were 
conflagration and homicide, respectively.  Allen testified that 
the body was found on the floor of the cabin a few feet from 
the bathroom door “in a fetal position,” App. I at 133, under 
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“a bunch of insulation . . . and other debris” that had fallen 
from the roof, id. at 116–17.  Allen and Mihalikis testified 
that there were “minimal” or “tiny” “hemorrhages in the 
upper portion of [Ji Yun’s] neck,” id. at 138, 405, 408, 420, 
that suggested “strangulation, . . . suffocation, or any pressure 
in the neck,” id. at 408.  They also found “minimal smoke 
deposits in the [victim’s] windpipe and . . . lungs” and a 
“slight elevation of [her] carbon monoxide levels.”  Id. at 120, 
405.  They concluded that the hemorrhage, smoke deposits 
and elevated carbon monoxide were all consistent with Ji Yun 
being strangled before the fire was started. 
 
 As Magistrate Judge Carlson noted, this inference was 
weak.  R&R at *9.  Allen and Mihalikis both acknowledged 
that the autopsy results were consistent with Ji Yun dying by 
a flashover7 rather than strangulation.  App. I at 132–33, 406–
407.  Mihalikis found no evidence of petechiae—tiny ruptures 
of the capillaries caused by increased blood pressure—that 
are present in “most strangulation cases.” Id. at 423. And 
Allen and Mihalikis’s determination that Ji Yun died by 
homicide was almost certainly colored by the now-debunked 
fire-science evidence. 
 
 Second, the Commonwealth introduced testimony that 
in the hours and days after the fire Lee’s demeanor showed 
little sign of grief.  Police Officer Leigh-Manuell, one of the 
first individuals on the scene, found Lee sitting across from 
                                              
7 A flashover is a phenomenon that causes “a fire within a 
room to suddenly, spontaneously, and catastrophically engulf 
all flammable surfaces in th[e] room.”  R&R at *2.  At the 
time of the trial, fire scientists incorrectly believed that 
flashovers were rare and that they left a “signature at a fire 
scene which could be distinguished from the tell-tale signs of 
arson.”  Id. 
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the fire on a bench with his luggage, appearing “nonchalant.”  
Id. at 20–21, 27.  Volunteer firefighter David Farry said Lee 
looked “very depressed, as if he was probably mad at 
himself.”  Id. at 56.  High school senior David Pack described 
Lee as “calm.” Id. at 162.  Fire Marshall Jones testified that 
the day after the fire Lee was “very attentive” to questions 
asked of him, and “at times he even joked and laughed during 
the questioning.”  Id. at 256.  Detective Bortz similarly 
described Lee as “calm.” Id. at 621.  And when Lee’s wife 
arrived at the scene of the fire, she became visibly upset, and 
yet, according to Fire Marshall Jones, Lee “walked right by 
[her] like nothing happened.”  Id. at 257.  
 Third, the Commonwealth argues that there was 
evidence attacking the veracity of Lee’s account of what 
happened the night of the fire.  Two firefighters on the scene 
testified that the fire started in the front of the cabin and then 
traveled to the back, id. at 40–41, 57–58, which conflicts with 
Lee’s testimony that when he walked out the front door the 
fire was in the back of the house. 
 The Commonwealth also points to inconsistencies in 
six different accounts Lee gave of what happened the night of 
the fire.  Commonwealth Br. at 36–37.  The basic outlines 
remain the same across each account: Lee woke up in the 
middle of the night, smelled smoke, walked through the cabin 
looking for his daughter, went outside, came back in and left 
again.  Id.  Most of the “inconsistencies” identified by the 
Commonwealth are better characterized as minor details 
mentioned on some occasions and omitted on others.  For 
example, Lee only sometimes identified specific rooms he 
checked when he reentered the house; only sometimes 
mentioned grabbing his luggage before leaving the cabin the 
second time; and only sometimes said that he slipped and fell 
on liquid after reentering the cabin.  Id.  Only two 
discrepancies could bear any significance at all.  In at least 
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one account, Lee reentered the house twice; in others he 
reentered only once.  And in at least one account, Lee saw 
flames before he left the house the first time; in four others, 
he saw flames only when he reentered the cabin.  Id.  The 
District Court characterized these discrepancies as “minor,” 
noting that they could be explained by errors in translation 
from Korean to English.  R&R at *8. 
* * * * * 
 Based on the evidence identified by the 
Commonwealth, we cannot conclude that the District Court 
committed an error that was plain by adopting the R&R.  As 
Magistrate Judge Carlson explained, 
[t]he Commonwealth [is] left to argue that its 
case . . . may be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt based upon alleged inconsistencies in the 
Korean-to[-]English interpretation of statements 
made by Lee in the hours following his 
daughter’s death; a cultural stoicism which was 
construed as nonchalance; . . . and autopsy 
results which agreed that Ji Yun Lee died from 
conflagration, but posited two alternate theories 
of this cause of death, one of which was wholly 
consistent with death in an accidental fire, and 
the other of which was supported by very little 
forensic evidence.  
Id. at *18.  Because the Commonwealth has not 
pointed to “ample evidence” sufficient to prove guilt 
beyond reasonable doubt, we affirm the District 
Court’s grant of habeas relief. 
 
 
